Boathouse - Evening 1 October
We noticed a ladder leading up to an open trapdoor in the ceiling of the boathouse; climbing it, we discovered a small storage area with just about enough room for the six of us to lie down. We had been on the go for a long time without rest and were much too tired to bother to appraise our situation. It was readily agreed that the best thing to do under the circumstances was to get rest and sleep. The others sprawled on the floor trying to get comfortable, as I sat trying to remain awake on the first watch. It seemed to me that the other five were all fast asleep within a few seconds.
A very few minutes went by when movement outside the boathouse could be heard. The door was rattled and excited voices broke the quiet of the night. I reached over and shook Neil awake, motioning to him not to make any sound. He whispered that we should not wake any of the others, being fearful that any sound made would give us away. We waited with baited breath, then the noise diminished and all was soon quiet again. In a few short minutes Neil was back to sleep once again.
It was only years later that we learned the truth about this incident. When the German patrol arrived at the three boathouses they readily entered two of them and carried out an unsuccessful search. However, when they were conronted with a locked entrance to the third boathouse, the officer in charge called them away, admonishing them for taking too much time with the padlock. He chastised them for not realizing that we could not possibly be in the locked boathouse. The Milorg group hiding in the underbrush were so close that they could easily overhear all that was said.
After about a half hour had passed I was startled to hear the door to the boathouse being opened. I crawled to the opening just in time to realize that someone was at the top of the ladder. His head and shoulders slowly emerged out of the void at the top of the ladder and he glanced around. He was wearing an oilskin type hat and coat, much like the other Norwegians had worn. He tumed to me and asked, "Is anyone hurt and in need of a Doctor?" His presence roused the others and we assured him that we were in good shape and did not need any medical attention. He told us that he had to leave then, but would be back within a half hour and that we should be prepared to go with him. This was our introduction to Helen Mowinkel-Nilsen, otherwise known to British Intelligence SOE (Special Operations Executive), Norwegian Section, as R-15.
Special Operations Executive, more commonly referred to as SOE, had been set up as an intelligence organization in July 1940, whose task it was to organize, assist and direct Resistance movements in enemy-occupied territories in conjunction with the overall Allied war effort. SOE had two functions: to instigate sabotage against the enemy and to prepare secret armies to join in the liberation of their countries. In carrying out its mission in Norway, SOE had several agents who, along with radio operators, had been either landed on the coast from boats or submarines, or had been parachuted into Norway. These agents were Norwegian nationals who in the main had fled their country after the Nazi invasion.
They organized resistance groups and prepared a nationwide guerrilla movement.
Mowinkel-Nilsen had escaped from Norway in February 1942. He had been involved in underground activity against the Germans and was a wanted man. He, along with some others, had crossed the North Sea in a small fishing boat. After arriving in England he had joined the Special Forces, had been trained in Scotland and eventually parachuted into Norway with a radio operator. His prime purpose was to organize the resistance, and train instructors in weapons and sabotage.
Originally, when we crashed, Nilsen had issued orders to his groups that they should not get involved with us for fear it would jeopardize an important weapons movement. Later, after contact had been made between the members of the Milorg group at Lepsoy with the group at Os, their scouts, checking the German activity to find us, reported that all signs indicated that the Germans would soon be combing the island and therefore a safer haven had to be found. Jacob Hjelle, the leader at Os, suggested that his group would be better able to hide us.
It was at this time that Nilsen became involved and the arrangements made for us to be taken from Strono to Lønningdal.
We noticed a ladder leading up to an open trapdoor in the ceiling of the boathouse; climbing it, we discovered a small storage area with just about enough room for the six of us to lie down. We had been on the go for a long time without rest and were much too tired to bother to appraise our situation. It was readily agreed that the best thing to do under the circumstances was to get rest and sleep. The others sprawled on the floor trying to get comfortable, as I sat trying to remain awake on the first watch. It seemed to me that the other five were all fast asleep within a few seconds.
A very few minutes went by when movement outside the boathouse could be heard. The door was rattled and excited voices broke the quiet of the night. I reached over and shook Neil awake, motioning to him not to make any sound. He whispered that we should not wake any of the others, being fearful that any sound made would give us away. We waited with baited breath, then the noise diminished and all was soon quiet again. In a few short minutes Neil was back to sleep once again.
It was only years later that we learned the truth about this incident. When the German patrol arrived at the three boathouses they readily entered two of them and carried out an unsuccessful search. However, when they were conronted with a locked entrance to the third boathouse, the officer in charge called them away, admonishing them for taking too much time with the padlock. He chastised them for not realizing that we could not possibly be in the locked boathouse. The Milorg group hiding in the underbrush were so close that they could easily overhear all that was said.
After about a half hour had passed I was startled to hear the door to the boathouse being opened. I crawled to the opening just in time to realize that someone was at the top of the ladder. His head and shoulders slowly emerged out of the void at the top of the ladder and he glanced around. He was wearing an oilskin type hat and coat, much like the other Norwegians had worn. He tumed to me and asked, "Is anyone hurt and in need of a Doctor?" His presence roused the others and we assured him that we were in good shape and did not need any medical attention. He told us that he had to leave then, but would be back within a half hour and that we should be prepared to go with him. This was our introduction to Helen Mowinkel-Nilsen, otherwise known to British Intelligence SOE (Special Operations Executive), Norwegian Section, as R-15.
Special Operations Executive, more commonly referred to as SOE, had been set up as an intelligence organization in July 1940, whose task it was to organize, assist and direct Resistance movements in enemy-occupied territories in conjunction with the overall Allied war effort. SOE had two functions: to instigate sabotage against the enemy and to prepare secret armies to join in the liberation of their countries. In carrying out its mission in Norway, SOE had several agents who, along with radio operators, had been either landed on the coast from boats or submarines, or had been parachuted into Norway. These agents were Norwegian nationals who in the main had fled their country after the Nazi invasion.
They organized resistance groups and prepared a nationwide guerrilla movement.
Mowinkel-Nilsen had escaped from Norway in February 1942. He had been involved in underground activity against the Germans and was a wanted man. He, along with some others, had crossed the North Sea in a small fishing boat. After arriving in England he had joined the Special Forces, had been trained in Scotland and eventually parachuted into Norway with a radio operator. His prime purpose was to organize the resistance, and train instructors in weapons and sabotage.
Originally, when we crashed, Nilsen had issued orders to his groups that they should not get involved with us for fear it would jeopardize an important weapons movement. Later, after contact had been made between the members of the Milorg group at Lepsoy with the group at Os, their scouts, checking the German activity to find us, reported that all signs indicated that the Germans would soon be combing the island and therefore a safer haven had to be found. Jacob Hjelle, the leader at Os, suggested that his group would be better able to hide us.
It was at this time that Nilsen became involved and the arrangements made for us to be taken from Strono to Lønningdal.